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IV. 
I. Statement of the Case 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Leslie Benz filed an action seeking to enforce her vendee's lien arising from a failed real 
estate transaction. She asked that her vendee' s lien be declared valid and superior to the liens of 
the other named parties and that money judgment enter against the Seller, East A venue Bluff, 
LLC. D.L. Evans Bank was joined as a secured creditor. A significant number of mechanics 
and materialmen lienholders were joined. 
B. Course of Proceedings Below. 
The complaint was filed on August 12, 2009. R Vol. I, p. 1, D.L. Evans Bank answered 
on August 25, 2009. R Vol. I, p. 31. Default judgment entered against certain defendants on 
November 5t11, 2009 and January 26th, 2010. R Vol. I, p. 36; p. 39. On April 5th 2010 Ms. Benz 
filed a motion for summary judgment against D.L. Evans Bank. R. Vol. I, p. 43. 
The motion for summary judgment was argued to the comi May 3 rd , 2010 following 
which the court entered its opinion from the bench. Tr Vol. I, p. 69, L. 19. On May l 9t\ 2010 
the court entered its "Order of Summary Judgment" R Vol. II, p. 350. D.L. Evans Bank filed an 
objection to the Plaintiffs form of the order of summary judgment on May 20111, 2010 R Vol. II, 
p. 354. 
Ms. Benz filed an affidavit of interest calculations on May 14, 2010 Supp. R Vol. I, p. 16. 
It was objected to on May 27, 2010 Supp. R Vol. I, p. 42. 
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On July 12,2010, Ms. Benz filed a "Motion for Attorneys Fees Pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 
37(c) and a notice of hearing thereon. Supp. R Vol. I, p. 61. 
Ms. Benz's motion relating to interest was heard on June 29111, 2010 following which the 
court entered a partial oral ruling. Supp. Tr p. 62. L. 8. 
The hearing on Ms. Benz's Rule 37(c) motion took place on August 2nd , 2010. The court 
entered an oral ruling reserving some issues. Supp. Tr Vol. I, p. 93 L. 20. On July 12, 2010 the 
court entered its order awarding prejudgment interest. Supp. R Vol. I, p. 82. The court issued a 
decision on the motion for Rule 3 7( c) on October 4t11, 2010 making an award of attorneys fees. 
Supp. R Vol. I, p. 118. An amended judgment entered on July 12,2010. R Vol. II, p. 366. A 
second amended judgment entered on February gt\ 2011. Supp. R Vol. I, p. 130. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
The Plaintiff, Leslie Benz, was personal friends with Stacy Rutherford and her husband, 
John. In 2007, she had a casual conversation with Rutherford about how much she would like to live 
in Ketchum. R Vol. I, p. 143. A few weeks later, in May of 2007, Rutherford called Benz and told 
her that Rutherford and her husband were considering developing a four-unit project. They met and 
went over the plans. R Vol. I, p. 14 3. After further discussions, and a visit to the property, Benz 
agreed to purchase one of the prope1iies. Benz signed the contract to purchase the property on June 
7, 2007 and deposited $100,000.00 earnest money into a trust account. R Vol. I, p. 144. The contract 
identified "Rutherford" as the Seller, but provided for assignment to East A venue Bluff, LLC of 
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which they were the only members. Eventually East A venue became the developer and the 
assignments were completed. Under the terms of the contract, Benz was to deposit $100,000.00 as 
earnest money in the Sun Valley Broker's, LLC trust account on or before June 8 and an additional 
$400,000.00 earnest money was to be deposited later, but a date is not specified. The $500,000.00 
was to be released to the Seller on or before June 21, 2007. R Vol. I, p. 51. 
On the same date, Benz signed an addendum which required Benz to make an additional 
payment of $250,000.00 earnest money on or before November 1, 2007. The addendum provided 
that the first $500,000.00 would be released to the Seller when the property acquisition was closed. 
The third deposit would immediately be released to the Seller. R Vol. I, p. 58. 
Benz signed another addendum on August 29, 2007. It was signed by East Avenue Bluff, 
LLC on August 30, 2007. It authorized disbursal of the $500,000.00 to Seller on or before August 
30, 2007. R Vol. I, p. 185. The record does not establish when the money was actually disbursed. 
To summarize Benz's payment history, she deposited $100,000.00 on June 7, 2007, and 
$400,000.00 on August 25, 2007. This money was disbursed upon her written instruction 
presumably on or after August 30, 2007. She paid $250,000.00 on November 13, 2007 directly to 
East Avenue Bluff, LLC. R Vol. I, p. 147 - p. 148. 
East A venue Bluff, LLC approached D .L. Evans Bank for a loan to finance the construction. 
Early in the loan approval process, D.L. Evans Bank was made aware of the Benz contract to 
purchase the prope11y and some of its terms. R Vol. I, p. 90. The bank's senior loan committee 
- 3 -
required a copy of the contract but it was never included in the loan file and it wasn't available to the 
committee in approving the loan. R Vol. I, p. 89; p. 79. The committee also required the loan officer, 
Ken Nelson, to acquire confirmation that Ms. Benz's financial condition was adequate to complete 
the purchase. In July, he contacted Ms. and advised her D.L. Evans Bank was working to put 
together a loan to finance the construction. Ms. arranged for a statement to be sent to D.L. 
Evans Bank from Castle Rock Mo11gage, which was considered in reviewing the loan. R Vol. II, p. 
308; p. 287. The senior loan committee mistakenly believed that the fact that the prope11y had been 
pre-sold, and that Ms. Benz would have a substantial cash investment, significantly decreased the 
risk factors associated with the loan. They were unaware of the statutory vendee's lien and its 
potential ramifications should the vendor default. R Vol. II, p. 308. The loan was approved and D.L. 
Evans Bank funded a loan of $2,650,000.00 on August 29, 2007. R Vol. II, p. 308. The deed of trust 
was recorded August 30, 2007. R Vol. II, p. 313. 
When Ms. Benz gave Ms. Rutherford the $100,000.00 check on June 7, 2007, she told Benz 
that she was going to walk the check around the corner to D.L. Evans Bank. At that point, Benz 
assumed they were getting a loan from D.L. Evans Bank. She also assumed that the Bank would be 
requiring a copy of the agreement R Vol. I, p. 80. 
When the construction was completed and the parties were in the process of closing the Benz 
purchase of the prope11y, it was learned that East A venue Bluff, LLC had failed to pay in excess of 
$213,000.00 in construction expenses which had been recorded as liens against the property. The 
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Bank was later presented with a draft settlement statement relative to closing the Benz purchase. 
The proposal was that D.L. Evans Bank be paid $1,772,220.53. R Vol. I, p. 87. At that time, the 
principle balance owing on the loan was $2,644,056.77 and the interest was in excess of 
$159,000.00. The payoff exceeded $2,803,000.00. R Vol. II, p. 319. Closing on that statement 
would have resulted in the Bank taking a loss in excess of $1,000,000.00. The pa1iies were left in a 
very difficult position. Ms. Benz had entered into a contract to purchase the property for 
$2,743,500.00. She had paid $750,000.00 of that sum to the Seller. In order to close a transaction, 
either Ms. Benz would have to pay an extra $1,000,000.00, or D.L. Evans Bank would take a 
$1,000,000.00 loss. The closing date was February 6, 2009. R Vol. I, p. 187. The sale did not close. 
On July 7, 2009 Ms. Benz terminated the East Avenue Bluff, LLC contract by written notice, R Vol. 
I, p. 184. 
Both parties entered into their respective transactions in good faith and fully performed in 
accordance with their obligations. Both were left holding the bag. 
D. Issues Presented on Appeal. 
1. Under what circumstances does a lien arise under Idaho Code § 45-804, when does it 
come into existence, and from what date does its priority run? 
2. What is the meaning of the term "good faith" as used in Idaho Code § 45-803 and was 
D.L. Evans Bank acting good faith in this transaction such that it is not subject to the 
Idaho Code § 45-804 lien? 
3. Is the priority of the Idaho Code §45-804 lien affected by the vcndee continuing to make 
payments after being made aware of senior interests? 
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4. Is the common law vendee's lien recognized in Idaho or is it appropriate to use its 
principles in interpreting Idaho's statutory lien? 
5. Was it appropriate to award Ms. Benz prejudgment interest and include it in the amount 
secured by a lien arising under Idaho Code § 45-804? 
6. From what date does prejudgment interest run for Idaho Code § 45-804 liens generally, 
and for such liens where there are contractual limitations on remedy? 
7. What significance does the exclusive and limited remedy provisions of the contract have 
to Ms. Benz's claims? 
8. the prior appellate rulings relating to prejudgment interest applicable to the facts of 
this case or should they be overturned, distinguished, or limited? 
9. establishing a fact by affidavit in a summary judgment proceeding constitute proof 
of a fact under I.R.C.P. 37(c)? 
10. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding attorney's fees under I.R.C.P. 37(c)? 
11. Were there factual questions appearing in the record, or unsupported findings of fact, 
making entry of the summary judgment improper? 
LAW AND ARGUMENT 
II. Lien of a Purchaser of Real Property (Ven dee's Lien) 
A. Introduction 
When a vendee enforces a lien against its vendor it is an action in the nature of rescission. 
McMahon v. Cooper 70 Idaho 139,212 P.2d 657 (1949); Graves v. Cupic, 75 Idaho 451, 
P.2d l 020 (1954). In determining the amount owing, the corni acts to put each oftbe parties 
back in the position they held prior to the transaction. There is no net gain or loss by either party. 
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When a vendee asserts a lien claim against a third party, however, it is a completely 
different situation. The third party did not receive the payments made by the vendee. Often, as 
in this case, the third party's interest in the property arose from payments or loans made by the 
third party to the vendor. If the property does not have sufficient value to discharge the 
obligations of both the vendee and the third party and the vendee has priority, it is able to shift its 
loss to the third party. The vendee's gain is the third party's loss. In the present case, Leslie 
Benz seeks to shift her loss resulting from the failure of her transaction with East Avenue Bluff, 
LLC to D.L. Evans Bank. 
1. Timeline 
• June 7, 2007 Ms. Benz signed a contract to purchase property upon which a 
townhouse was to be built to her specifications. R Vol. I, p. 144. 
• June 7, 2007 Ms. Benz made a nonrefundable earnest money deposit of 
$100,000.00 into an escrow. R Vol. I, p. 144. 
• June 7, 2007 Ms. Benz was advised D.L. Evans Bank was involved and assumed 
it was making a loan. R Vol. I, p. 80. 
• July, 2007 D.L. Evans Bank was aware of the Benz contract and its payment 
terms when it approved a construction loan to fund construction of the townhouse. 
R Vol. I, p. 90. 
• July 2007 D.L. Evans Bank contacted Ms. Benz and advised her it was 
working on a loan. R Vol. II, p. 308. 
• August 25, 2007 Ms. Benz made an additional nonrefundable earnest money 
deposit of $400,000.00 into the escrow. 
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2. 
• August 29, 2007 D.L. Evans Bank funded the loan. R Vol. II, p. 308 
• August 29, 2007 Ms. Benz signed Addendum 1 authorizing the escrow to 
disburse the funds to East A venue Bluff, LLC on or before August 30, 2007. R 
Vol. I, p. 185 
• August 30, 2007 D.L. Evans recorded the deed of trust. R Vol. II, p.313 
• August 30 2007 East A venue Bluff, LLC signed Addendum 1 authorizing 
the escrow to disburse the funds to East Avenue Bluff, LLC on or before August 
30, 2007. R Vol. I, p. 185. 
• It is unknown in the record when the escrow disbursed the 
funds. 
• November 13, 2007 Ms Benz made an addition payment of$250,000.00 directly 
to the vendor. R Vol. I, p. 147 -p. 148. 
• February 6, 2009 The closing date. R Vol. I, p. 187. 
• July 7, 2009 Ms. Benz sent vendor a notice terminating the contract. R 
Vol. I, p. 184. 
• May19,2010 Oral ruling on Summary Judgment. Tr Vol. I, p. 69, L. 19. 
Overview 
Ms. Benz claims a vendee's lien pursuant to Idaho Code § 45-804 and asks that it be 
given priority over the recorded deed of trust of D.L. Evans Bank. There is no question but that 
Ms. Benz has a right to a lien, the question is when did the lien come into existence and from 
what date does its priority run? Is it when the vendee signs the contract; when the vendee makes 
a payment; when there is a failure of consideration; or when there is a judicial determination 
- 8 -
there has been a failure of consideration and of the amount the vendee is entitled to recover? 
Idaho adopted R.S. § 3444 in 1887, providing for a lien of a purchaser of real property. Such 
a lien is commonly referred to as a vendee's lien. It is currently set forth at Idaho Code§ 45-804. A 
related statute adopted the same year is Idaho Code § 45-803, providing priority. 
Considering the statutes have been in place for over 123 years, there is a pronounced lack of 
authority relating to them. They fail to specifically answer the single mo st important issue in this 
case: When does the lien come into existence and from what date does the priority of the vendee's 
lien run? A second issue relates to the priority of payments made after the vendee becomes aware of 
another creditor. 
3. Standard of Review 
The standard of review for summary judgment is as follows: 
In an appeal from a summary judgment, we apply the same standard of review utilized by the 
district court when ruling on the motion. Scana, Inc. v. Green Willow Trust, 133 Idaho 283, 
286,985 P.2d 1145, 1148 (1999); Drew v. Sorensen, 133 Idaho 534,537,989 P.2d 276,279 
( 1999). Summary judgment may be entered only if "there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). In this case, the parties stipulated to the pertinent facts, and it 
is not contended that there are any material factual issues. Therefore, the sole issue presented 
by the motion is one of law upon which we exercise free review. Roell v. Boise City, 130 
Idaho 199, 200-01, 938 P.2d 1237, 1238-39 (1997); Frie! v. Boise City Haus. Auth., 126 
Idaho 484,485, 887 P.2d 29, 30 (1994); Farm Credit Bank o_(Spokane v. Stevenson, 125 
Idaho 270, 272, 869 P.2d 1365 (1994). 
Kenneth F. TYhite, Chtd. V St A!phcmses Regional Medical Center, 136 Idaho 238,240, 31 P.3d 926, 
928 (Ct.. App. 2001) 
The issue raised on the I.R.C.P. 37(c) ruling is an abuse of discretion standard. De,sfosses v. 
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Desfosses 122 Idaho 634, 836 P.2d 1095 (Ct. App. 1992) and Tomich v. City of Pocatello, 127 Idaho 
394, 901 P.2d 501 (1995). 
B. Idaho Code§ 45-804, Vendee's Lien. 
The trial court found that Leslie Benz had a vendee' s lien which had priority over the deed of 
trust recorded by D.L. Evans Bank. Tr Vol. I, p. 69. D.L. Evans Bank requests that this ruling, and 
judgment entered thereon, be reversed based upon the following alternative grounds: 
1. The vendee's lien priority runs from the date of the filing of a notice ofpendency of 
action in a lawsuit brought to establish that there is an amount owing to the vendee upon a failure of 
consideration. 
2. If the priority of a vendee' s lien runs from the date payments were made, in this case 
there is either an absence of proof establishing a date a payment was made, or payments were clearly 
made after the recording of D.L. Evans Bank deed of trust. 
3. D.L. Evans Bank was an encumbrancer in good faith and for value, and therefore not 
subject to the vendee's lien of Ms. Benz. 
4. There are unresolved factual questions which preclude entry of summary judgment. 
§ 45-804. Lien of purchaser of real prope1iy 
One who pays to the owner any part of the price ofreal prope1iy, under an agreement 
for the sale thereof, has a special lien upon the property, independent of possession, 
for such part of the amount paid as he may be entitled to recover back, in case of a 
failure of consideration. 
The following rule of statutory construction has been adopted in Idaho. 
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"The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, over which this Com1 exercises 
free review." State v. Hensley, 145 Jdaho 852,855,187 P.3d 1227, 1230 (2008). The 
statute is viewed as a whole, and the analysis begins with the language of the statute, 
which is given its plain, usual and ordinary meaning. Id. In determining the plain 
meaning of the statute, "effect must be given to all the words of the statute if 
possible, so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant." Stale v. ~Mercer, 143 
Idaho 108, 109, 138 P.3d 308,309 (2006) (quoting In re Winton Lumber Co., 57 
Idaho 131, 136, 63 P.2d 664, 666 ( 193 6). The plain meaning of a statute will prevail 
unless the clearly expressed legislative intent is to the contrary or unless the plain 
meaning leads to absurd results. Gillihan v. Gump, 140 Idaho 264, 266, 92P.3d514, 
516 (2004), abrogated on other grounds by Gonzalez v. Thacker, 148 Idaho 879,231 
P .3 d 524 (2009). "If the language of the statute is capable of more than one 
reasonable construction it is ambiguous," and a statute that is ambiguous must be 
construed with legislative intent in mind, which is asce11ained by examining "not 
only the literal words of the statute, but the reasonableness of the proposed 
interpretations, the policy behind the statute, and its legislative history." 
State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 4 71, 4 75, 163 P .3 d 1183, 1187 (2007). 
A review at the Idaho Legislative Research Library established that Idaho Code § 45-804 
predates available legislative history materials by several decades. All that is available is the text of 
the statute as it was adopted, which is the same as it is today. While the statute was reenacted a 
number of times, it has not been amended. 
The statute provides initially that "one who pays to the owner any part of the price of real 
property, under an agreement for the sale thereof, has a special lien upon the prope1iy ... " That sounds 
as though the lien arises upon payment as opposed to when the contract was signed. On the other 
hand, the statute later limits this language. It goes on to state that the vendee has a special lien upon 
the prope11y, "independent of possession, for such pm1 of the amount paid as he may be entitled to 
recover back, in case of a failure of consideration." The lien is not for all amounts paid by the 
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vendee, only that "part of the amount paid as he may be entitled to recover back" and it is tied to 
"failure of consideration." This seems to indicate the lien comes into existence, and the priority runs 
from the date the amount owing is determined following a failure of consideration in a proceeding 
brought for that purpose. 
Most liens are predicated on an amount owing from the outset. Consider the liens of 
mechanics and materialmen arising under Idaho Code § 45-501 where work has been done, or 
materials have been provided but not paid for. It is the creation of the debt with an amount 
actually due and owing, that establishes the existence and the priority date of the lien. This is a 
common thread in the lien statutes. In the case of the vendee's lien, there is no amount owing 
until there is a failure of consideration and a court determines both that there has been a failure 
of consideration and the amount owing. This should be the date when the lien is created. 
1. Priority of the Vendee's Lien 
Idaho Code § 45-803 provides: 
45-803.Vendor's Lien - Extent. The liens of vendors and purchasers of real property are 
valid against every one claiming under the debtor, except a purchaser or encumbrancer in good faith 
and for value. 
This statute establishes priority, but does not establish when the lien comes into 
existence, nor the date from which priority runs. These must be determined under Idaho Code § 
45-804. Section 803 also uses the term "good faith and for value" in defining the exception for 
an encumbrancer". Black's Law Dictionary revised fourth edition 1968 defines good faith as 
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follows: 
Honesty of intention, and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to 
put the holder upon inquiry. Siano v. Helvering, D.C.N.J., 13 Supp. 776, 780. An 
honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of another, 
even through technicalities of law, together with absence of all infom1ation, notice, or 
benefit or belief of facts which render transaction unconscientious. Wa,fzeld Natural 
Gas Co. v. Allen, 248 Ky. 646, 59 S. W.2d 534, 91 A.L.R. 890; Crouch v. First Nat. 
Bank, 156 Ill. 342, 40 N.E. 974; Waugh v. Prince, 121 Me. 115 A. 612,614. 
Good faith is defined in the context of banking by Idaho Code§ 28-4-605(1)(f) which provides: 
28-4-605. Other Definitions. (1) In this part: 
(fYGood faith" means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial 
standards of fair dealing. 
When D.L. Evans Bank was negotiating and completing the loan to East A venue Bluff, 
LLC it was well aware that Leslie Benz had signed a contract to purchase and would be making 
payments of earnest money totaling $750,000.00. D.L. Evans Bank was to provide the 
financing, exceeding $2,600,000.00, for construction of the townhouse that Ms. Benz was 
purchasing. In other words, it was by vi1iue ofD.L. Evans Bank's loan that East Avenue Bluff, 
LLC would be able to perform its contract with Ms. Benz. There is absolutely no evidence that 
D.L. Evans Bank made any effort to take an inconscientious advantage of Ms. Benz. There is no 
evidence that at the time the loan was being negotiated and closed that D.L. Evans Bank had any 
information which would lead to the conclusion there would be a failure of consideration. There 
is absolutely nothing in the record to establish that D.L. Evans Bank would benefit at Ms. Benz 
expense from an East Avenue Bluff, LLC default. Indeed, the record affirmatively establishes 
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that D.L. Evans Bank went to great lengths to assure not only that East A venue Bluff, LLC would 
fully perform its obligations, but also that Ms. Benz would fully perform hers. Tr Vol. II, p. 286; 
p. 306. Tr Vol. I, p. 89; p. 90-94. 
When D.L. Evans Bank funded the loan to East Avenue Bluff, LLC, it was to Ms. Benz's 
benefit not to her disadvantage. The loan would allow construction of the townhouse she wanted 
to purchase built to her specifications. She was aware that construction would be financed and 
she was aware it was being financed by D.L. Evans Bank. She entered into and performed her 
contract in good faith. D.L. Evans Bank entered into and performed its contract in good faith. 
Neither defaulted or engaged in inequitable conduct. Both suffered substantial losses as a result 
of the default. Ms. Benz wishes to shift her loss to D.L. Evans Bank. 
Under the standard of good faith as defined above, it is clear that D.L. Evans Bank was an 
encumbrancer who acted "in good faith and for value" in acquiring its deed of trust securing its 
loan. Ms. Benz's lien is not valid as to D.L. Evans Bank. 
C. Idaho Cases. 
In McMahon v. Cooper, 70 Idaho 139,212 P .2d 657 (1949) the parties entered into a contract 
for the sale of two building lots. McMahon took possession and began to place improvements on the 
property which were contemplated in the contract. McMahon brought this action seeking a return of 
the payments made, the reasonable value of improvements and to have a lien declared on the 
premises. A notice of pendency of action was filed for record on January 26, 1948. 
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Cooper sold the property to Eldridge in March of 1948, who granted a mortgage to Provident 
Federal Savings and Loan Association. Regarding the question of a vendee's lien and its priority, the 
Court had the following to say: 
Appellant is entitled to have the amount found due him declared a lien on the 
premises and to have such lien foreclosed. Section 45-804, I.C.; 66 CJ. 1497; 55 
Am.Jur. 941. The to the respondents, Eldredge, and the m011gage to the 
respondent, Provident Federal Savings and Loan Association, were made after the 
notice of pendency of suit was filed, and are inferior to appellant's lien. 
Id. at 70 Idaho 14 7, 212 P 662. This language supports the conclusion the vendee' s lien does not 
exist until it is declared to exist in an action to establish the right to recover payments and the amount 
found due the vendee. The priority runs from the date the notice of pendency of suit is filed. 
McMahon establishes both the date the lien comes into existence and the date from which priority 
runs. This is consistent with language of Idaho Code § 45-804. 
In Graves v. Cupic, 75 Idaho 451, 272 P.2d 1020 (1954). The vendee brought an action 
against the vendor. There was no third party interest involved. The court expressly applied Idaho 
Code § 45-804. 
The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded with directions to the trial comi 
to enter judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants for the sum of 
$10,758.02 (being the amount paid on the contract less $3,741.98 damages for loss of 
rents and profits during the time plaintiff withheld possession of the prope1iy), with 
statutory interest on $3,000 thereof from November 1st, and on the balance from 
December 4, 1952, Sorensen v. Larue, 47 Idaho 772,278 P. 1016; and providing a 
lien on the property involved to secure payment of the judgment, and for the 
foreclosure of such lien. 
Id. at fdaho 460, 272 P.2d 1026. The opinion determines the right to recover and the amount 
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owing as required by the statute. It directs the trial comi to enter judgment "providing a lien on the 
property involved to secure payment of the judgment, and for the foreclosure of such lien." 
This opinion is consistent with the McMahon. Both McMahon and Graves create the lien in 
the judgment determining the vendee's right to recover and the amount owing. McMahon bases its 
finding of priority as to third parties on the prior filing of the notice pend ency of action. If these rules 
hold, the Benz lien did not exist until the court determined that "part of the amount paid" that she was 
"entitled to recover back" upon "a failure of consideration." The priority of the Benz lien as to D .L. 
Evans Bank is determined by the date she recorded her notice of pendency of action. 
Neither McMahon nor Graves cites Idaho Code § 45-803. In the absence of its application, 
perhaps the rule expressed applies where the "good faith encumbrancer" exception to the statute does 
not apply. D.L. Evans Bank falls under both rules and its deed of trust is prior to Ms. Benz. 
D. Erroneous Factual Findings 
The trial court made the following findings of fact which were not established in the 
record or were substantially disputed: 
1. $500,000.00 got paid and applied right to the bank's deed of trust. Tr Vol. 
I, p. 74 L. 24. 
There is absolutely nothing in the record showing the $500,000.00 was applied to D.L. 
Evans Bank's deed of trust. 
2. The bank knew how the arrangement between East A venue Bluff, LLC 
and Ms. Benz was going to work. Tr Vol. I, p. 70, L. 9. 
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There is evidence in the record D.L. had knowledge of part of the 
arrangement but there is nothing showing that it knew the whole arrangement. 
3. The bank knew Avenue Bluff, LLC would have title to the prope1iy 
before their deed of trust would attach to the property. Tr Vol. I, p. 70, L. 
9. 
There is absolutely nothing in the record establishing this. 
4. The bank knew of and benefited and expected to benefit from Ms. Benz 
making the last contractual payment. 
While the contract called for the payment to be paid to D.L. Evans Bank. Tr Vol. I, p. 76. 
L. 2. It was uncontrove1ied that no $250,000.00 payment was made to D.L. Evans Bank. R Vol. 
II, p. 319 -p. 322. 
5. That Plaintiff's payments were used to acquire or improve the subject 
property which was relied upon by the bank. R Vol. II, p. 3 51. 
There is absolutely no evidence what happened to Ms. Benz's payments. 
6. $400,000.00 of Ms. Benz's money was used to purchase the lot. Tr Vol. I, 
p. 70 L. 5. 
There is absolutely nothing in the record establishing this fact. 
7. The bank knew that East Avenue Bluff, LLC was using Ms. Benz's money 
to close on the sale from the paiiy they were buying it from. Tr Vol. L p. 
70 L. 9. 
There is absolutely nothing in the record establishing this. 
8. The bank knew that East Avenue Bluff, LLC was using Ms. money 
to close on the sale from the paiiy they were buying it from. Tr Vol. L p. 
70 L. 12. 
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There is absolutely nothing in the record establishing this. 
9. They (the bank) knew were the money was coming from Ms. Benz and 
how it was being used and how A venue Bluff, LLC was using it. Tr 
Vol. I, p. 70 L. 17. 
There is absolutely nothing in the record establishing this. 
I 0. They had the contract between 
Vol. I, p. 70 L. 19. 
Avenue Bluff, LLC and Ms. Benz. Tr 
There is nothing in the record establishing this at the time of the summary judgment 
motion. There was absolutely nothing in the record before the trial court relating to a copy of the 
contract being in the possession of D.L. Evans Bank at any time. This was first raised by Ms. 
Benz in the motion on the I.R.C.P. 37(c) motion. What she established at that point was that a 
copy of the contract had been discovered in a shadow file, but even at that Ms. Benz fails to 
establish when that contract came to be located in that shadow file which was created over a 
several year period most of which was after this transaction closed. 
E. The Common Law Vendee's Lien 
A vendee' s lien is recognized at common law. There are two A.LR. annotations on point: 
W. R. Habeeb, Annotation, Right of Vendee Under Executory Land Contract to Lien for 
Amount Paid on Purchase Price, 33 A.LR. 2d 1384. (1954) 
John P. Ludington, LLB., Annotation, Right ofVendee under Executory Land Contract to 
Lien for Amount Paid on Purchase Price as against Subsequent Creditors of or Purchasersfi'om 
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Vendor. 82 A.LR. 3d 1040. (1978) 
The latter applies to claims asserted against third parties. 
The common law vendee's lien has not been recognized in Idaho. Under such circumstances 
the statutory lien prevails. 
White next argues that even if he cannot satisfy the criteria for a statutory lien, he 
possesses a common law or equitable lien to secure his claim for fees and costs. 
Idaho law, however, is to the contrary. In Frazee v. Frazee, l 04 Idaho 463,464,660 
P.2d 928,929 (l 983), the Idaho Supreme Com1 observed that an attorney's charging 
lien "did not exist in Idaho at common law, " and in Kerns v. Washington Water 
Power Co., 24 Idaho 525, 536, 135 P. 70, 73 (1913), the Court stated that prior to the 
enactment of the statute that is now codified as J.C.§ 3-205, "there was no law in this 
state which provided for a lien for attorney's fees." 
Kenneth vVhife, Chtd. v. St Alphonses Regional lvfedical Center, 136 Idaho 238,242, 31 P.3d 926, 
930 (Ct. App. 2001). 
though it is clear the common law lien does not apply in Idaho it may be of some 
interest to the Court. With respect to the general rule of priority the annotation states: 
2[ a] Summary and Comment-Generally a subsequent mo11gagee ofrealty takes free 
of an earlier vendee's lien when the mortgagee lacked notice of the vendee's rights. 
A subsequent m01igagee's lien is inferior to an earlier vendee's lien where the 
m01igagee had notice of the vendee's rights before taking the mortgage. However, in 
states where a vendee's lien does not arise until the vendee makes a payment under 
the contract, a mortgage lien is superior if it arises before the vendee makes a 
payment, even thought he contract of sale predated the mmigage. 
82 A.LR. 3d 1040, 1043 (1978). 
The annotation notes the following exception: 
2[ a] Summary and Comment - Generally. It has also been held that a vcndee's lien 
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is not superior to the claim of the vendor's subsequent creditor to the extent that the 
vendee continued to make payments to the vendor after learning of the subsequent 
creditor's rights. Although the vendee need not examine records for subsequent 
encumbrances such as mortgage, his payments after receiving actual notice of a 
mortgage do not give him a lien superior to the mortgage lien. 
82 A.LR. 3d 1040, 1044 (1978). 
With respect to what constitutes knowledge the annotation notes in the context of the vendor's notice: 
2[b] Summary and Comment - Practice Pointers. The knowledge need not extend to 
the vendee's claim. The third person has notice if he has knowledge of facts 
sufficient to excite the inquiry of a reasonably prudent man as to the existence of 
rights in others. 
82 A.LR. 3d 1040, 1045 (1978). 
If the common law rules were applicable instead of the Idaho statute, it would be problematic 
for Benz's cause of action. A look at the timeline explains why. Ms. Benz first became aware of 
D.L. Evans Bank on June 8, 2007 when she paid the $100,000.00 earnest money deposit into a trust 
account. She also had a conversation with Ken Nelson sometime in July. Ms. Benz deposited 
$400,000.00 earnest money into the trnst account on August 25, 2007. The East Avenue Bluff, LLC 
Promissory :\Jote to D.L. Evans Bank was signed August 29, 2007, as is the Deed of Trust. 'TT1e Deed 
of Trust was recorded on August 30, 2007. Ms. Benz gave written authorization to disburse the trust 
proceeds of $500,000.00 to A venue Bluff, LLC, signed by her on August 29, 2007 and by East 
Avenue Bluff, LLC on August 30, 2007. Ms. Benz paid $250,000.00 earnest money directly to East 
Avenue Bluff, on :\lovember 13, 2007. All payments to East Avenue Bluff, LLC were made 
after Ms. Benz had knowledge ofD.L. Evans Bank loan. The record does not establish whether the 
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payment authorized on August 30 was made before or after the deed of trust was recorded. The 
payment on November 13 was clearly after the deed of trust was recorded. 
III. Prejudgment Interest 
D.L Evans Bank asks the court to review and either overrule or limit the rulings in 
McMahon v. Cooper, Supra, and Graves v. Cupic, Supra, for the following reasons: 
1. Enforcement of a Vendee's lien is an equitable proceeding. [Wilson v. Sunnyside 
Orchard Company, 33 Idaho 501, 196 P. 302 (1921)]. Requiring a third party which did not 
receive the payments and did not enjoy the time value of money would be contrary to equity. It 
would require the third party to pay interest out of its equity on a debt it didn't owe. 
2. Idaho Code § 45-804 does not include prejudgment interest within the amount 
secured. 
3. Prejudgment interest is only payable when the vendee is granted rescission in an 
action against the vendor. 
A. Entitlement to Prejudgment Interest 
In McAfahon v. Cooper, Supra, an action brought by the vendee against the 
vendor and subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers, the comi directed that judgment 
be entered for the amount found due "with interest." 
A1cl'vfahon does not state whether the legal rate referred to is the rate applicable to the 
judgment or if it is the rate applicable to money due. It also does not state whether the interest 
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accrues from the date of the judgment, when the amount owing was determined and the lien 
created, or from some earlier time. 
In Graves v. Cupic, Supra, an action brought by the vendee against the vendor, the trial 
cowi directed that judgment enter, including statutory interest from the date each payment was 
made. 
In Sorensen v. Larue 47 Id. 772,278 P. 1016 (1929), the vendee counterclaimed for 
rescission for failure of title. The trial com1 found for the vendee and granted rescission. With 
respect to the question of prejudgment interest the Supreme Cour1 states: 
"When rescission is granted the vendee, he is entitled, not only to a return of so much as a 
purchase price as he has paid, but the interest thereon from time of payment." "(citation 
omitted)" Id. at 278 P. 1018. McMahon and Graves also involved rescission. This case does 
not involve rescission. 
Ms. Benz remedy was expressly limited under the terms of her contract with East 
Avenue Bluff, LLC. In a case of failure of title the exclusive remedy is termination. As to D.L. 
Evans Bank, Ms. Benz had no remedy at all and no right to either rescission or termination. R 
Vol. I, p. 51; 56. No contractual relationship existed between D.L. Evans Bank and Ms. Benz. 
Prejudgment interest is inappropriate. 
The trial court applied the twelve percent rate applicable to money due under Idaho Code 
§ 28-22-104( 1 ). It also concluded that rate should be applied from the closing date, February 6, 
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2009, to May 3,2010, the date of its oral ruling. The total interest award was $111,207.58. R 
Vol. II, p. 352. 
D.L. Evans Bank asks the Comito limit interest under McMahon and Graves to actions 
for rescission between the vendee and vendor. This is consistent with Idaho Code § 28-22-
104(1 ), Idaho Code § 45-804 and the cases cited above. The original vendor received the 
payments and enjoyed the time value of the money. That is an appropriate fact to consider in 
determining how to restore the parties to their original position in a rescission action. Where, as 
here, the lien is being asse1ied against a third paiiy which did not receive payments from the 
vendee, the third paiiy did not enjoy the time value of money. It is not a rescissionary remedy 
where both parties are being restored to their prior position with no net change in position. 
Interest awarded to the vendee is a direct loss to the third party. 
Idaho Code § 28-22-104(1) provides in part that it applies to: 
1. Money due by express contract. 
4. Money received to the use of another and retained beyond a reasonable time without 
the owner's consent, express or implied. 
Idaho Code § 28-22-104( 1) applies to "Money due by express contract" or "Money after 
the same becomes due." This is the section applied by the trial comi. 
There was no contractual relationship between Ms. Benz and D.L. Evans Bank. No money 
was due from D.L. Evans Bank to Ms. Benz by express contract. No money was due from D.L. 
Evans Bank to Ms. Benz otherwise. The trial court made no finding of money due from East Avenue 
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Bluff, LLC to Ms. Benz based upon rescission. The Plaintiff is not entitled to a monetary judgment 
against D.L. Evans Bank, and did not obtain rescission against East Avenue Bluff, LLC. 
Application of Idaho Code § 28-22-104(1) is proper in a rescission action when money is 
due, but no money is due here. 
In Farnsworth v. Pepper, 27 Idaho 154, 148 P .48 (1915), the Supreme Court established the 
principle that unless the lien statute provided that it also covered attorneys fees, then attorneys fees 
were not recoverable as costs in an action to foreclose a lien. In addressing the claim of a vendor's 
lien, the Supreme Court states: 
A petition for rehearing has been filed in this case, and the first point made by the 
petitioner is that an attorney's fee of $400 was allowed for the foreclosure of said 
vendor's lien, while under the statute a vendor's lien is only permitted as security 
for the unpaid purchase price and not for any other indebtedness or liability, and 3 
Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence,§ 1251 and Gardv. Gard, 108 Cal. 19, 40 Pac. 
1059, are cited. 
As a matter of fact the trial comi did adjudge that the attorney's fee allowed 
should be a lien upon said premises. While section 3441, Rev. Codes, provides 
for a vendor's lien upon prope1iy sold "for so much of the price as remains unpaid 
and unsecured otherwise than by the personal obligation of the buyer," under the 
provisions of said statute an attorney's fee for foreclosing the lien is not made a 
lien upon the land sold. Therefore the judgment in this case must be modified to 
the extent of holding said attorney's fee not a lien upon the land in question. 
Id. at 148 P. 50. 
The Supreme Comi also applied the same rule in a case involving a mechanic's lien. 
LC.A. § 44-705 makes no provision for attorney's fees which were therefore 
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improperly included in the lien foreclosure, but we may eliminate from the 
proceeds of the sale to which respondent was entitled the attorney's fees, without 
vitiating the sale because any balance of the sale proceeds are to be paid to the 
owner, and in the absence of fraud and where the excess can be segregated as it 
can here claim of amount does not vitiate the lien. Wheatcroft v. 
Griffiths, 42 Idaho, 231, P. 71; Eskestrand v. Wunder, 94 Mont. 57, 20 P .(2d) 
622; Shumway v. Woolwine, 84 Cal.App. 220,257 P. 898 Lucas v. Gobbi, 10 Cal. 
App. 648, 103 P. 157; Snell v. Payne, 115 Cal. 218, 46 P. 1069 (second case). On 
the argument on rehearing, respondent virtually admitted the attomey's fees should 
be eliminated. 
Seafoam ,Mines Corporation v. Vaughn, 56 Idaho 342, 53 P.2d 1166, 1170 (1936). 
It would appear that the same rationale applicable to attorney's fees would also be applicable 
to prejudgment interest. The lien statute defines what is secured by the lien. If the statute does not 
identify interest it should not be included. Idaho Code§ 45-804 provides a lien for "such part of the 
amount paid as he may be entitled to recover back, in case of a failure of consideration." The vendee 
has not paid interest. The lien is limited to part of the amount paid. Prejudgment interest should not 
be included in the amount of the lien to be enforced against the third party interest of D.L. Evans 
Bank in the property. 
B. The Exclusive Contractual Remedy 
Idaho Code §28-22-104(1) provides for interest for, amongst other things, money due. It does 
not provide for interest on money not yet due. The Real Estate Purchase And Sale Agreement, R Vol. 
L p. 51, has the following clause: 
Default by Seller It is agreed that if the title of said property is not marketable, or 
cannot reasonably be made so within twenty (20) business days after notice 
containing a written statement of defects is delivered to the Seller, or if the Seller 
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defaults in the performance of this Agreement including Seller's obligations (if any) 
to correct defects pursuant to Paragraph 8) C of the Inspection Contingency, the 
Buyer has the option of (I) having the Earnest Money returned to the Buyer and this 
Agreement shall tern1inate; or (2) pursuing any other lawful right or remedy to which 
the Buyer may be entitled, including specific performance. In the case of option (I), 
the Buyer shall make demand in writing upon the holder of the Earnest Money. 
Upon such demand. and provided there is no dispute as to the Seller's default. said 
holder shall refund the Earnest Money to the Buyer. Seller shall pay for the unpaid 
costs incurred of title insurance and escrow fees, if any, and any unpaid costs 
incurred by or on behalf of the Seller and the Buyer related to the transaction, as set 
forth in this Agreement. (emphasis added). 
R Vol. I, p. 56. Addendum A, R Vol. I, p. 58, has the following clause: 
By Seller. If Seller defaults in the performance of this Agreement, Buyer's sole and 
exclusive remedy shall be the termination of this Agreement by written notice to 
Seller and escrow holder, and the return of all deposits made hereunder, excluding 
any interest thereon, and Seller shall pay the costs of cancellation of title insurance, if 
any, escrow fees, if any, and such attorneys' fees, expenses and costs as permitted in 
the Purchase and Sale Agreement, if any. Buyer shall not be entitled to seek damages 
or specific performance against Seller or escrow holder. ( emphasis added) 
R Vol, I, p. 63. 
Under the terms of the contract and addendum, there is no amount due until a written notice 
of termination is sent. Benz sent her notice July 7, 2009. R Vol. I, p.184. The trial court computed 
interest from the closing date, which it found to be the date of default, February 6, 2009. Supp. R 
Vol. I, P. 83; P. 84. At that time no money was due from East Avenue Bluff, LLC to Ms. Benz. 
There is also the clause excluding interest to deal with. By contract Ms. Benz is not entitled to 
interest or damages. 
The contractual remedy is not the same as the remedy under Idaho Code § 45-804. The 
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contractual remedy is for all earnest money deposited and some related costs. The money is due only 
when there is a notice of termination. There is to be no interest. The statutory lien is "for such part 
of the amount paid as he may be entitled to recover back, in case of a failure of consideration." The 
statutory lien may well be for an amount less than the contractual remedy. There is no amount due 
until that amount is determined. Where the exclusive statutory remedy contradicts the statute, the 
contract should control. 
IV. I.R.C.P. 37(c) Award for Failure to Admit 
The trial court awarded Ms. Benz attorneys fees pursuant to l.R.C.P. 37(c) for failure to 
admit. Supp. R Vol. I, p. 118. Ms. Benz served discovery on September 2, 2009. Supp. R Vol. 
I, p. 98. It included Request for Admission No. 2 which reads as follows: 
"REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 2: Admit that D.L. Evans Bank knew, or should 
have known, the terms of the purchase and sale contract between East Avenue BluffLLC 
and Leslie Benz, including the payment release provisions and dates, prior to closing on 
its loan to East Avenue Bluff, LLC." 
The request for admission has three statements which require denial. First, it establishes 
a specific date for the state of knowledge, "prior to closing on its loan to East A venue Bluff, 
LLC." Second, it utilizes broad language which would admit that D.L. Evans Bank knew or 
should have known all of the terms of the contract. Third it adds a "should have known" 
standard which invokes questions of underwriting standards as compared to constructive notice if 
it goes beyond what was in the Bank's records. 
D.L. Evans Bank maintains an official loan file which contains all original documents and 
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materials officially submitted to the bank's senior loan committee in approving the loan and 
subsequent closing. This official file was copied and produced to Ms. Benz in its entirety on 
October 23, 2009. Supp. R Vol. I, p. 95. This production included the Loan Analyst Addendum 
submitted to the senior loan committee informing it of some of the provisions of the Benz 
agreement. R Vol. I, p. 90. It had the following: 
Primary source of repayment will be the proceeds from the sale of the home upon its 
completion. The home has been pre sold to Leslie Benz for $2.744MM, who has 
already committed $500M of non refundable earnest money to the project, with an 
additional $250M on or before November 1st . 
It is the practice in the bank for loan officers, or others, involved with a loan to maintain 
their own files which often contain materials in addition to the official file. These are referred to 
as shadow files. D.L. Evans Bank also gathered all of the shadow files relating to the Benz 
transaction, copied them and provided them verbatim to Ms. Benz on February 17, 2010 .. Supp. 
R Vol. I, p. 95. No materials from this production were presented to the trial comi by Ms. Benz 
for consideration in the swnmary judgment proceeding. This second production was the bulk of 
the documents produced. 
I.R.C.P. 36(a) requires that a denial shall fairly meet the substance of the requested 
admission. Ms. Benz immediately followed Request for Admission No. 2 with Interrogatory No. 
7, in sequence. Supp. R Vol. I. p. 95. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 7: If your response to Request for Admission No. 2 is not a 
complete and unqualified admission, please state each and every fact, belief or opinion 
upon which you base your response and for each such fact provide the relevant date(s) and 
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paiiicipating individuals." 
D.L. Evans Bank believed, and believes, that the response to this interrogatory met the 
requirements of Rule 36(a) for qualifying its answer. D.L. Evans Bank's response to 
Interrogatory No. 7 is as follows: 
"ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 7: Based uponD.L. Evans Bank's current 
document review, there is no basis for admitting that D.L. Evans Bartl<: knew or 
should have known the terms of the Purchase and Sale Contract between East A venue 
Bluff, LLC and Leslie Benz, including the payment release provisions and dates prior 
to closing on its loan to East A venue Bluff, LLC. The senior loan committee was 
advised of the fact that a sale existed and some its terms, but the contract itself was 
not presented to the senior loan committee and the Bank's documentation, to this 
point of the review, has not established that the contract itself was received by the 
Bank prior to the closing of the loan. In this regard, the loan officers in the loan are 
no longer employed by D.L. Evans Bank and D.L. Evans Bank has been attempting, 
without success, to obtain information from them relating to this transaction." 
R Vol. I, p. 78. 
D.L. Evans Bank stands by its denial of Request for Admission No. 2 and its Response to 
Interrogatory No. 7 which accurately and precisely reflect the state of D.L. Evans Bank's file and 
knowledge. D.L. Evans Bank produced it's records setting forth the precise materials and 
information available to the senior loan committee. D.L. Evans Bank admitted that as of 
7/31/2007 it knew Ms. Benz had purchased the property, had already committed $500,000.00 and 
was paying an additional $250,000.00 before November 1st . 
I.R.C.P. 37(c) provides that: 
"If a paiiy fails to admit the genuineness of any document or the truth of any matter as 
requested under Rule 36, and if the party requesting the admissions thereafter proves 
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the genuineness of the document or the truth of the matter, the requesting party may 
apply to the court for an order requiring the other party to pay the reasonable expenses 
incurred in making that proof, including reasonable attorney's fees. The court shall 
make the order unless it finds that (1) the request was held objectionable pursuant to 
Rule 36(a), or (2) the admission sought was of no substantial importance, or (3) the 
party failing to admit had reasonable ground to believe that the pa1ty might prevail on 
the matter, or (4) there was other good reason for the failure to admit." 
The specific question under Rule 37(c) is whether Ms. Benz proved the truth of the matter 
as requested under Rule 36. The first question is whether establishing a fact by affidavit in a 
summary judgment proceeding is "proof' for the purposes of the rule? 
By its plain terms, Rule 37( c) authorizes sanctions only in favor of a party who, after 
a request for admission was denied, "thereafter proves ... the truth of the matter .... " 
(Emphasis added.) Here, although Wallace's refusal to admit one or both of the 
Paynes' requests for admissions may have been unreasonable, he ultimately stipulated 
to liability, thereby removing the issue of his negligence or the Paynes' comparative 
negligence from the issues to be contested at trial. Applying the plain language of 
Rule 3 7( c ), we conclude that in this circumstance, because the Paynes were not called 
upon to prove at trial the covered by the requests for admissions, Rule 37(c) 
sanctions were properly denied by the district court. 
Payne v. Wallace, 136 Idaho 303,309, P.3d 695, 701 (Ct. App. 2001). Is submission of an 
affidavit in a summary judgment proceeding proof of the truth of the matter? Is it still proof of 
the matter if the only facts set fo11h in the affidavit are admissions of the opponent in discovery? 
These are questions for the Court. 
There was absolutely nothing in the record before the trial court for the summary 
judgment establishing D.L. Evans Bank knew all of the terms of the purchase and sale contract 
before it closed the loan. The only way you could reach such a conclusion is to draw an 
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inference from the fact the senior loan committee was provided some of the contract terms in the 
Loan Analyst Addendum . In a summary judgment proceeding all inferences are to be drawn if 
favor of the nonmoving party. Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 53 9, 808 P .2d 8 76 (1991) There is 
absolutely nothing in the record showing appropriate underwriting standards required knowledge 
of all of the contract terms. 
In this case the only affidavit suppo11ing the motion for summary judgment was that of 
Janet C. Wygle dated the 2nd day of April, 2010. R Vol. I, p. 46. The affidavit establishes a series 
of excerpts from the depositions of Leslie Benz and Bruce Hunsaker together with exhibits to the 
depositions. The only reference to D.L. Evans Banks' state of knowledge in Wygle's affidavit is 
in her paragraph 8 and the attached exhibit G which shows excerpts of pages 92-96 of the 
deposition of Bruce Hunsaker. It also attaches Exhibit 9, the Loan Analyst Addendum and 
Exhibit 10, the Commercial Loan Memorandum which D.L. Evans Bank produced to Mrs. Benz 
in its first production. This excerpt and the exhibits are consistent with, and in the case of Exhibit 
9, the basis for, the response to interrogatory 7. They established the following: 
1. The Loan Analyst Addendum, Exhibit 9, was prepared by C.J. Weaver who was a 
D.L. Evans Bank loan analyst 
2. Loan Analyst Addendum was provided to Ken Nelson as part of his loan 
package then went to his manager, then regional and then up to senior loan committee. 
3. second paragraph of Exhibit 9 states as set forth in the quote above. 
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4. Bruce Hunsaker believes that of July 31 st 2007 D.L. Evans Bank knew the terms 
of the contract between East Avenue Bluff, LLC and Ms. Benz as set fo1th on Exhibit 9. R Vol. 
I p. 89. This constitutes the "proof' upon which the trial court relied in making the I.R.C.P. 
37(c) award. It is the only evidence in the record. 
What the Wygle affidavit fails to establish is any proof beyond the response to 
interrogatory 7. There was no evidence which would allow the trial court to find that the facts 
set fo1ih in Request for Admission No. 2 had been proven in their entirety for the purposes of the 
summary judgment motion. It would be pure speculation to make a finding of what D.L. Evans 
Banks' state of knowledge was beyond that specifically set forth in the Wygle affidavit. Failure 
to offer proof does not meet the requirement ofl.R.C.P. 37(c). 
l.R.C.P. 37 (c) provides four exceptions to an award of fees. Three are applicable here. 
The primary reason that the I.R.C.P. 3 7 ( c) award was inappropriate arises in exception no. "2": 
"the admission sought was of no substantial importance". Ms. Benz argued the need to prove 
knowledge. D .L. Evans Bank admitted knowledge of the contract and of the fact that there 
would be prepayments, the amount of the prepayments, and when they had been or would be 
made. These admissions were the only things presented to the court and relied upon by the court 
in making its determination on a summary judgment. There was absolutely no benefit to Ms. 
Benz whatsoever, or to the comi, from an admission that D.L. Evans Bank knew all of the other 
terms of the contract. 
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Exception number three allows a party to not admit where it has reasonable grounds to 
believe that the paiiy might prevail on the matter. For the purposes of the summary judgment, 
D.L. Evans Bank did prevail because no proof was offered it knew all of the terms of the contract 
prior to closing the loan. 
Exception number four applies where there is a good reason for the failure to admit. 
There was a good reason. Based on the bank's file it wasn't true. D.L. Evans Bank went fmiher. 
It responded to Interrogatory No. 7 by specifically setting forth why it was denied and by 
providing its records showing what it did know. It also provided all of the evidence in its records 
tending or actually showing its state of knowledge. It expressly admitted that the senior loan 
committee was aware of the Benz transaction and some of its terms and provided the documents 
showing precisely the terms known. Under the circumstances that response fully met the intent 
and policy of properly responding to a request for admission. 
It is very important to note that not all of the materials produced by D.L. Evans Bank 
were presented to the trial comi for consideration on the summary judgment. The record created 
by Ms. Benz for the purpose of her I.R.C.P. 37(c) motion relied on Hunsaker deposition excerpts 
not presented to the trial comi for the summary judgment. R Vol. I, p. 81. Beyond that, Ms. Benz 
began to argue D.L. Evans Bank did have a copy of the contract in its files. Supp. R Vol. I, p. 90. 
This is a fact not presented to the trial comi for consideration on the summary judgment and 
therefore not paii of the "proof." D.L. Evans Bank acknowledged in its briefing on the I.R.C.P. 
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37(c) motion that a copy of the contract had been found in a shadow file and was pa11 of the 
second production of documents to Ms. Benz. It also pointed out it was unable to determine 
when it was placed in the shadow file which had been accumulated over a two year period. Supp. 
R Vol. I, p. 111. None of this was available to the trial court at the time the summary judgment 
entered. 
The trial court's decision on the I.R.C.P. 37(c) motion takes some interesting positions, 
but it fails to recognize and address the fact that the only facts proven by Ms. Benz were those 
admitted by D.L. Evans Bank by its production of the records showing the state of knowledge 
and which was consistent with its response is interrogatory no. 7. This is a circumstance where 
D.L. Evans Bank was attempting to be very precise and thorough in responding to discovery: 
Even the trial court recognized D.L. Evans Bank efforts in that regard. 
"I think the Bank has been forthright in their admission saying here's specific facts that 
we'll admit". Supp. Tr Vol. II, p. 97, L. 12. 
V. Conclusion 
D.L. Evans Bank requests that the Court reverse the Second Amended Judgment. R Supp. R 
Vol. I, p. 130 and all related orders; and/or reverse the Order on Application for Costs and on 
Objections to Attorney's Fees and Interest. Supp. R Vol. I, p. 82; and/or set aside the award of 
I.R.C.P. 3 7(c) sanctions as set forth in the Decision on Attorney Fees for Failure to Admit Pursuant 
to Rule 37(c). Supp. R Vol. L p. 118; and remand with appropriate instructions to the trial coui1. 
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R.C. Stone 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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